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Abstract 
The primary purpose of the Supreme Court is to interpret the constitution. The Court determines 
whether acts in society are Constitutional. Because of this responsibility, the Court itself is an 
institution that influences and is influenced by ideology and rhetoric. Because society‘s ideology 
changes due to humans conversing with one another, so does the law. Given this context, 
America‘s First Amendment provides an abundant body of artifacts where the law and rhetorical 
ideology overlap. One particular right granted in the First Amendment is the freedom to speak. 
This right granted by the Constitution is titled the free speech clause. This clause has been a 
subject of debate throughout American history. Furthermore, this right has been defined, re-
defined, and shaped to fit certain particular interests in society. The Supreme Court last year 
made a recent landmark decision that concerns freedom of speech and campaign finance. This 
study will examine Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission in order to investigate the 
rhetorical strategies and ideological influences embedded within the decision. The 
methodological tool of McGee‘s proposed ideograph will be used in order to answer the 
following research question: What role does ideology, concerning free speech, play in the 
Citizens United v. FEC? From the given analysis, two ideographs emerged, <Marketplace of 
ideas> and <Corruption>. These two ideographs provided the basis to articulate an ideological 
framework by which scholars can understand the Supreme Court and answer the following 
research question. Furthermore, the analysis of this decision assisted this study to explain 
possible implications and conclusions from the ruling in Citizens United.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The First Amendment provides U.S. citizens a number of rights that are to be protected 
by and from the government. Some of these include the right to practice religion, to assemble 
and to petition the government. One particular right granted in the First Amendment is the 
freedom to speak. The freedom of speech clause reads ―Congress shall make no law…abridging 
the freedom of speech.‖ The language drafted in this sentence makes it clear that no law by the 
government shall prohibit the freedom of speech. In the vernacular, this right can be considered 
absolute. However, the Supreme Court has not always seen this right as absolute. This is because 
of the constant changes to the Court and its responsibility as a governmental institution.  
The primary responsibility of the Supreme Court is to interpret the Constitution and 
assert what is constitutional. Because of this responsibility, the Supreme Court holds a principle 
by which judges are obliged to respect the precedents established by prior decisions. This 
principle is called stare decisis, and it means ―to stand by decisions and not disturb the 
undisturbed‖ (Walker, 2010).  Because the composition of the Court changes through time, as a 
result, so does the Court‘s jurisprudence. An example can be noted in the first landmark case that 
concerns freedom of speech. In 1919, the Court handed down Schenk v. United States. Because 
of this legal principle, the presumed thought would be that the ideological doctrine of ―clear and 
present danger‖ test would stand. However, in Abrams v. United States, the Supreme Court 
backtracked from this test and created a new test, the ―bad tendency‖ test. The facts of both cases 
are similar, but the Court still changed its stance from the prior test. Given this short turn around 
and the binding influence the Supreme Court holds, it is vital for rhetoricians to examine these 
decisions and understand what rhetorical and ideological influences are at play. In light of these 
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examples, one particular area the Court has struggled to maintain a steady ideological position 
concerns corporation activity during elections.  
On January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court handed down Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission 558 U.S. 50 (2010). This landmark decision gave corporations, unions, and 
non-profits the ability to contribute unlimited from their general treasuries into the campaign 
cycle through TV/Radio broadcasts and Political Action Committees (PACs). This decision 
virtually created a new ideological position concerning this issue. Though corporations still 
cannot contribute directly to candidates, this decision released the bans on how much they can 
contribute to a campaign for the election or defeat of a candidate. The significance of this 
decision provoked President Obama to say in the 2010 State of the Union Address: 
Last week, the Supreme Court reversed a century of law to open 
the floodgates for special interests - including foreign corporations 
- to spend without limit in our elections. Well, I don't think 
American elections should be bankrolled by America's most 
powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities. (Toobin, 2010) 
In the wake of the 2010 mid-term elections, some of the practical implications concerning this 
decision are now being realized. In fact, financial disclosures in the 2010 election cycle show 
that congressional candidates have raised $3.8 billion, virtually eclipsing fundraising in the last 
three election cycles going back to 2004. Michael Toner, a former Federal Election Commission 
chairman, told the AP during the election ―We may be on track for the most expensive cycle 
ever, even more than ‗08, which is really hard to believe!‖ (Weber, 2010). Understanding that 
campaign expenditures in a mid-term election had eclipsed the most televised and anticipated 
presidential election in recent history shows how this recent decision can have foundational 
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impacts in our society. Finally, because Citizens United overturned a series of landmark laws and 
cases, it is vital to understand that departure. Therefore, this paper‘s research question is: 
RQ1: What role does ideology, concerning free speech, play in the Citizens United v. FEC? 
In the field of Communication Studies, a body of literature and practice specializes in 
examining human discourse. This field of study is appropriately titled rhetorical studies. The 
practice of rhetorical criticism begs a critic to examine an array of messages within a document. 
A critic examines these messages that are created through the process of human discourse. 
Rhetorical studies call these documents rhetorical artifacts, as they resemble an artifact that 
contains clues concerning human thought patterns (Hart, 2005). Therefore, rhetorical critics 
practice their work by examining a document, articulates the thought patterns, and surface 
specifiable consequences from human decision making within a given moment. No other 
documents are more fruitful for examination than Supreme Court decisions. Because of the given 
research question, a methodology in rhetorical criticism can assist the critic in establishing how 
ideology played a role in Citizens United.  
Michael McGee‘s ideographic methodology will be the vehicle of this research project. 
McGee proposed a method that assists a critic in establishing a cultural ideology by identifying 
an ideograph and its usage. McGee defines an ideograph as an abstract and ill-defined term that 
promotes cultural commitment to a normative goal (McGee, p.15). Identifying the ideographs in 
Citizens United can explain the justices‘ ideology and the justification for their decision making. 
Because the ruling had both a majority and a dissenting opinion, examining both opinions will be 
important. Because of this endeavor, it will be expected that competing viewpoints will arise, 
and as a result, colliding ideographs. In order to reach the analysis though, a few other steps will 
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need to be taken. Therefore, this study will be organized into five chapters. Chapter one provides 
a rationale and basis for this research project. Chapter two examines the robust literature 
concerning how the Supreme Court treated freedom of speech and how rhetoricians examined 
this institution. Chapter three lays out the methodological procedure and examples of how the 
ideograph has been used. Chapter four is the analysis. Chapter five discusses the possible 
implications concerning the analysis of Citizens United.  
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Chapter 2 - Examination of the Literature 
Scholars have long acknowledged that ideology plays a significant role in the creation 
and implementation of laws (Haplin, 2006; Nelson, 2001; Hansen-Thomas, 2007). Because 
ideology has remained a term that scholars in a variety of disciplines define in several ways, the 
broadest and most applicable definition of ideology is a body of doctrine, belief, or myth that 
guides an individual, large class of people, social movement, or institution (Webster‘s, 2010). 
However, ideology does not uproot itself from nothing. In fact, the creation of an individual‘s 
ideology comes from humans conversing. It is understandable then that the ideological position 
of society will change by allowing citizens to voice their concerns and interact with one another. 
This in turn will influence how laws are created and maintained. As a result, it is understandable 
then holding onto the notion that the law is an objective concept free from the pressures of 
sophistry and rhetoric is a false conception. Because the law is designed to shape political and 
social communities, the process of making the law and its application is intrinsically and 
thoroughly communicative (Parker, 2003; Lewis, 1994 p. 8; Lucaites & Weithoff, 1994, p.1).  
Therefore, the position of this study falls on White‘s assumption, that binding documents, such 
as the law, is constitutive rhetoric because language creates communities among speakers, 
listeners, and those about whom they speak (White, 1985). No other rhetorical artifacts are more 
fruitful for examination than the laws created through the institutions of government. One 
institution that heavily influences societal thought patterns and ideology is the Supreme Court. 
Because of the given research question, the process of reviewing the literature will examine how 
freedom of speech developed within the Supreme Court and how rhetoricians examined this 
institution. First, it will be important to know how ―freedom of speech‖ influenced the Supreme 
Court‘s jurisprudence.  
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 Freedom of Speech in America 
One of the rights, designated in the First Amendment, is the freedom of speech. It reads: 
―Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech.‖ Because this study concerns 
the freedom of speech clause, it is important to know that the U.S. Supreme Court handed down 
its first landmark decision in 1919. During World War I, Charles Schenck, a member of the 
Socialist party, was responsible for printing, distributing, and mailing 15,000 leaflets to men 
eligible for the draft that advocated opposition to the draft (Tedford & Herbeck, 2001). These 
leaflets contained statements such as: ―Do not submit to intimidation,‖ ―Assert your rights,‖ ―If 
you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is 
the solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain.‖ Charles Schenck 
would be convicted under the Seditious Act of 1917 and Espionage Act of 1918. The Court 
would up hold the conviction. From this sole decision, a century of battle and interpretation 
would confront the Court concerning freedom of speech in the United States. A number of cases 
preceded this case concerning a variety of legal questions under the free speech clause.  
Proceeding shortly after Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919), the Court was 
faced with the legal question of whether does the Espionage Act violates the free speech clause 
of the First Amendment. In Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919), the defendants were 
convicted on the basis of two leaflets they printed and threw from windows of a building. One 
leaflet, signed ―revolutionists,‖ denounced the sending of American troops to Russia. The second 
leaflet, written in Yiddish, denounced the war and US efforts to impede the Russian Revolution. 
The defendants were charged and convicted for inciting resistance to the war effort and for 
urging curtailment of production of essential war material. They were sentenced to 20 years in 
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prison. The Court, in a 7-2 decision, determined that the law did not violate First Amendment 
protection freedom of speech. Oliver Wendell Holmes eloquently dissented by saying:  
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed 
it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure 
of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference 
between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the 
narrower sense is the speaker‘s enthusiasm for the result. 
Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of 
the redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a 
present conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs expressed in 
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the 
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free 
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their 
way. (p. 9)  
These two cases, established the tension between the ―clear and present danger‖ test and the ―bad 
tendency‖ test. This tension between the competing tests demonstrates how the Supreme Court 
itself is a rhetorical institution that influences and is influenced by ideology. Because of this, 
Justice Holmes would later assert the ―marketplace of ideas.‖ This model overtime has become a 
standard that the Court placed as a goal when deciding cases. One of those cases that highlight 
the development of this model would be Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969).  
Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later 
convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating ―crime, 
sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or 
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political reform,‖ as well as assembling ―with any society, group, or assemblage of persons 
formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.‖ The Court accepted the case 
for review. The legal question in front of the Court was whether the criminal syndicalism law in 
Ohio violated Brandenburg‘s right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. The Court‘s Per Curiam opinion held that the Ohio law did violate Brandenburg‘s 
right to free speech. The Court used a two-pronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be 
prohibited if it is ―directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action‖ and (2) it is ―likely 
to incite or produce such action.‖ With this landmark case, the Court demonstrated that they 
were backing away from the ―bad tendency‖ test and show their will to provide an absolute 
freedom of speech to the citizens of America. The Court would take another turn concerning 
freedom of speech that was a direct influence on the Citizens United case. This turn can be found 
in the Texas v. Johnson 491 U. S. 397 (1989) and Tinker v. Des Moines 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
cases respectively. These two cases show the Court‘s willingness to protect political and 
symbolic speech.  
In Texas v. Johnson 491 U. S. 397 (1989), Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag 
as a means of protest against the Reagan administration‘s policies. Johnson was tried and 
convicted under a Texas law outlawing flag desecration. He was sentenced to one year in jail and 
assessed a $2,000 fine. After the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, the 
case went to the Supreme Court. The legal question in front of the Court concerned whether the 
desecration of an American flag, by burning or otherwise, a form of speech that is protected 
under the First Amendment. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Johnson's burning of a flag 
was protected expression under the First Amendment. The Court found that Johnson's actions 
fell into the category of expressive conduct and had a distinctively political nature. The fact that 
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an audience takes offense to certain ideas or expression, the Court found, does not justify 
prohibitions of speech. The Court also held that state officials did not have the authority to 
designate symbols to be used to communicate only limited sets of messages, noting that ―if there 
is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not 
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.‖ Like the Brandenburg case, this was a stand by the Court to demonstrate their 
willingness to protect political speech and expression, even if it was highly disagreeable. Unlike 
this case, another case gave the precedent by which the Court would acknowledge as basis for 
the decision in Citizens United. Tinker v. Des Moines was a case that allowed the Court to carve 
out the interpretation that the Constitution even protects symbolic speech.  
John Tinker, 15 years old, his sister Mary Beth Tinker, 13 years old, and Christopher 
Echardt, 16 years old, decided along with their parents, to protest the Vietnam War by wearing 
black armbands to their Des Moines schools during the Christmas holiday season. Upon learning 
of their intentions and fearing the armbands would provoke disturbances, the principals of the 
Des Moines school district resolved that all students wearing armbands be asked to remove them 
or face suspension. When the Tinker siblings and Echardt wore their armbands to school, they 
were asked to remove them. When they refused, they were suspended until after New Year's 
Day. The lawsuit would find itself resting in front of the Court with this legal question: does a 
prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school, as a form of symbolic protest, 
violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech protection? The Court would decide that it was 
a violation of their constitutional freedoms.  
These decisions highlight how the Court at first limits speech to then break down prior 
precedent to extend the constitutional freedom of speech to the citizens. Because of the nature of 
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this study, it is important to address how another ideological influence of the Court assisted the 
result in Citizens United. This concerns the notion that individual corporations have rights like a 
person and the rights of a business to enter and exit in contracts. Given these two notions, there 
are other cases that shape our understanding the logic behind Citizens United.  
Corporate personhood has always been an area of debate and will continue to be. This 
constitutional notion provides civil liberties to a corporation as if they were normal citizens. The 
idea of corporate personhood first emerges in Santa Clara County V. Southern Pacific R. Co., 
118 U. S. 394 (1886). In this case, the state of California taxed fences owned by Southern Pacific 
Railway Company, but Southern Pacific asserted that the state Constitution only allowed taxes 
on ―the franchise, roadway roadbed, rails, and rolling stock.‖ Southern Pacific also claimed that 
state tax board did not properly subtract its outstanding mortgages from the value of its property. 
Southern Pacific refused to pay taxes on its fences and the difference account for by subtracting 
outstanding mortgages. Santa Clara County brought action against it in a state Court. The county 
argued that since it could tax the land which situated the fences, it could also tax the additional 
value of the land added by the fences. Southern Pacific had the action moved to a federal district 
Court, which ruled that the state did not have jurisdiction to tax fences. The county appealed to 
the Supreme Court. The Court was faced with two legal questions: Did the California 
Constitution allow the state to increase property taxes against railroad companies when the 
companies added additional value to the property by building fences? Did the state tax board 
wrongfully tax property without deducting for the outstanding mortgages against the property 
owners? The Court concluded unanimously that the state tax board tried to levy a single sum 
against the railway company which both wrongfully included the value of the fences and 
excluded a deduction for the outstanding mortgages. The state tax board increased taxes on the 
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property based on an arbitrary measure of the value added by the fences. The state Constitution 
required the state and its counties to separately assess the ―land, and improvements thereon‖ 
before increasing taxes. A state statute specified fences as a form of land improvement. This 
decision famously implied that equal protection laws provided by the Fourteenth Amendment 
applied to corporations. Amid this decision, the Court would further provide protections to 
corporations and the beginning precedent of campaign finance would emerge.  
The beginnings of protected campaign spending can be found in Trustees of Dartmouth 
Coll. V. Woodward, 17 U. S. 518 (1819). Though this case does not directly consider political 
campaigns, the legal logic behind the case considers the notion of how corporations can spend 
their money. In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to change Dartmouth College—a 
privately funded institution--into a state university. The legislature changed the school's 
corporate charter by transferring the control of trustee appointments to the governor. In an 
attempt to regain authority over the resources of Dartmouth College, the old trustees filed suit 
against William H. Woodward, who sided with the new appointees. The legal question before 
Court considers whether the New Hampshire legislature unconstitutionally interfered with 
Dartmouth College's rights under the Contract Clause? In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court held that 
the College's corporate charter qualified as a contract between private parties, with which the 
legislature could not interfere. The fact that the government had commissioned the charter did 
not transform the school into a civil institution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that 
the term ―contract‖ referred to transactions involving individual property rights, not to ―the 
political relations between the government and its citizens.‖ This decision gave corporations the 
ability to donate, spend, and expedite their private finances in the way they feel best. Amid these 
two cases and its direct effects on the ideological framework of preceding Justices for the Court, 
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there are a few direct cases that are vital to the knowledge and understanding of the decision in 
Citizens United.  
Given the basis of how free speech has developed in the United States, this paper can 
now turn to examine how the Court directly examined issues that concerned protecting the 
political process and freedom of speech. The cases to examine that are critical to the Citizens 
United case are Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); Austin V. Mich. Chamber Of Comm., 494 
U. S. 652 (1990); and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission Et Al - 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
These three cases highlight the development of how the Court struggled to balance protecting the 
integrity of the political process and establishing freedoms for all.  
Because of the notion that ―money can buy elections,‖ the Court has always struggled to 
allow corporations to spend at will like normal citizens in elections, especially due to the distinct 
advantage corporations concerning immediate access to money. Furthermore, state and federal 
legislatures have also attempted on many fronts to curb the political participation of corporations. 
The first landmark case that considered this area directly was Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 
(1976). In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in 
political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the 
law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it 
required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election 
Commission was created to enforce the statute. It would not be long till a constitutional 
challenge developed considering the notion it would violate corporate rights as a person. 
Therefore, the legal question concerning this case considered whether the limits placed on 
electoral expenditures by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and related provisions of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech and 
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association clauses? In this complicated case, the Court arrived at two important conclusions. 
First, it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates 
did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the ―integrity of 
our system of representative democracy‖ by guarding against unscrupulous practices. Second, 
the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns, the 
limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the 
limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. In other words, 
money is speech. Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption 
that individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve 
a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association. In 
essence, this decision started the battle between corporations being discriminated in the political 
process compared to their human counter-parts. While this decision shut the doors on 
corporations‘ ability to use general treasury funds to support or oppose a candidate, it left open 
the door for individuals to spend without limit. Even though corporations can still contribute to 
Political Action Committees (PACs), it would not be long till the Supreme Court decision was 
challenged again.  
In Austin v. Mich. Chamber Of Comm., 494 U. S. 652 (1990), the Court would have to 
return to their established logic and decide if it holds water constitutionally. In this case, 
Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibited corporations from using treasury money for 
independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections for state offices. However, 
if a corporation set up an independent fund designated solely for political purposes, it could 
make such expenditures. The law was enacted with the assumption that ―the unique legal and 
economic characteristics of corporations necessitate some regulation of their political 
14 
 
expenditures to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption.‖ The Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce wanted to support a candidate for Michigan's House of Representatives by using 
general funds to sponsor a newspaper advertisement. This case demonstrates how the Court 
would even have to recognize the political process on the State level.  
The Court was faced with the legal question of whether the Michigan Campaign Finance 
Act violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court said ‗no‘ and reaffirmed their 
commitment highlighted in Buckley. The basis of the decision recognized the Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce argument, that it should have been excluded from the act's restrictions since the 
Chamber was a ―nonprofit ideological corporation,‖ which was more analogous to a political 
association than a business firm. However, the Court disagreed and upheld the Michigan law. 
Justice Marshall found that the Chamber was akin to a business group given its activities, 
linkages with community business leaders, and high degree of members (over seventy-five 
percent) which were business corporations. Furthermore, Marshall found that the statute was 
narrowly crafted and implemented to achieve the important goal of maintaining integrity in the 
political process. Given this commitment, the fight for equal rights by corporations would not 
end.  
In early 2002, a years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to 
reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during--political campaigns culminated in the 
passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-
Feingold bill). Its key provisions were a ban on unrestricted (―soft money‖) donations made 
directly to political parties (often by corporations, unions, or well-healed individuals) and on the 
solicitation of those donations by elected officials. Two limits on the advertising that unions, 
corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election. 
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Finally, there were set restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf 
of candidates (in the form of ―issue ads‖ or ―coordinated expenditures‖). 
The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early 
federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by-passing the typical 
federal judicial process. In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the 
Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's 
restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the 
Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals. 
The legal question in front of the Court considers whether the ―soft money‖ ban of the 
Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 exceed Congress's authority to regulate elections under 
Article 1, Section 4 of the United States Constitution and/or violate the First Amendment's 
protection of the freedom to speak? And do regulations of the source, content, or timing of 
political advertising in the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 violate the First Amendment's 
free speech clause? With a few exceptions, the Court answered ―no‖ to both questions in a 5-to-4 
decision written by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and John Paul Stevens. Because the 
regulations dealt mostly with soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and 
increase attendance at the polls, not with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a 
statement of political values and therefore deserve more protection), the Court held that the 
restriction on free speech was minimal. It then found that the restriction was justified by the 
government's legitimate interest in preventing ―both the actual corruption threatened by large 
financial contributions and... the appearance of corruption‖ that might result from those 
contributions. 
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In response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct 
that had not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or 
unions), the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from 
circumventing the law. Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that ―money, like water, will 
always find an outlet‖ and that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent 
schemes developed to get around the contribution limits. 
The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate 
elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. The Court found that the law only 
affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent 
states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections. Given the basis of how 
the Court examined the constitutional issue of campaign finance and participation by 
corporations, the framework by which the Court would decide Citizens United would lead to 
uproar and backlash from all sides and fronts in the United States.  
At any rate, what can be drawn from the number of legal cases that uphold governmental 
regulation and struck down governmental regulation? Simply stated, the Supreme Court is a 
rhetorical institution confined to the communicative standards of America‘s ideological values. 
The next section will then argue that this institution is rhetorical in nature.   
 Supreme Court as Rhetorical Institution  
One of the most important legal-political institutions in America is the Supreme Court 
because of its ability to shape American culture (Brigham, 1987; Miller, 1978; Posner 1985), and 
its role as the ultimate interpreter of legislative and executive decisions. One of the most 
influential treatments of this issue in recent years is the argument advanced by Robert A. Dahl in 
1957. Dahl offers a sophisticated ―political‖ view of the role played by the Court, arguing that it 
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is an active participant in the ruling of national coalitions which dominate American politics but 
does not perform the task of protecting fundamental minority rights that is often attributed to it 
(Casper, p. 2). The Court, like other political institutions provides decisions that are typically 
supportive of the policies emerging from other political institutions. This effort by the Supreme 
Court makes them an ideal candidate of study within rhetorical theory.  
The idea that the Supreme Court is an institution that is larger than political debate is a 
false conception. The notion that there will be an institution to interpret the law and determine if 
it is constitutionally valid was an idea that established during the Constitutional debates. 
Therefore, knowing the Supreme Court is an idea resulting from rhetorical debate provides any 
scholar the basis to examine the Court and its decisions through a rhetorical lens.  Furthermore, 
rhetorically analyzing legal documents produced by the Supreme Court is an effective way to 
establish its impact on society (Gibson, p.160). 
Studying the law through this lens demonstrates how ideas created by the Court, e.g. 
separate but equal, produces rhetorical ideologies that frame America‘s opinions by the language 
they use in the given opinions. This endeavor is important because the rhetorical dimensions 
created within the law institutionalize relations of power in a community, and order society‘s 
conceptions of social justice (Crenshaw, p. 183). Therefore, the law is a dependent subject of 
abstraction and a binding substance that represents the community‘s political action (Hasain, 
Condit and Lucaties, p. 333).  
Because legal decisions can make a significant impact on a society, the study of judicial 
decisions can further illuminate the U.S. Supreme Court as a distinctly rhetorical institution 
bounded by America‘s ideological culture (Gibson, p. 173). Furthermore, because the 
Constitution is a political document, it can be reasoned that the Supreme Court is inseparable 
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from American culture for two reasons. First, the Court is instrumental in shaping culture by 
defining ideology and second, the Court justices are products of ideology. The Justice‘s 
jurisprudential philosophies are shaped through public interaction and discourse (Twigg, p. 4). 
Providing the rationale that the Supreme Court is a rhetorical institution, many scholars in the 
field of rhetoric have examined the Court in a variety of ways.  
 Rhetorical Examination of The Supreme Court 
Justice Cardozo himself asserted that dicta statements made by the dissenters ―speaks to 
the future, and his voice is pitched to a key that will carry through the years‖ (p.6). Furthermore, 
Justice Harlan once said ―one man‘s vulgarity is another man‘s lyric.‖ Furthermore, Harlan 
states: 
Much of linguistic expression serves a dual communicative 
function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, 
detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as 
well… We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while 
solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or 
no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, 
may often be the important element of the overall message sought 
to be communicated‖ (p. 26).  
With this statement, it is clear that not only is speech a critical component of our Constitutional 
freedoms, but that the Constitution itself is a rhetorical artifact that bends and turns to fit the need 
of the day. Because of this notion, scholars in the field of communication studies have taken a 
number of approaches to examine how the Court operates rhetorically.  
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One rhetorical approach has been to examine the Court generically. Rodgers analyzed the 
majority and dissenting opinions of Justice William O. Douglas (Rodgers, p.233). Rodgers 
analyzed several opinions by Justice Douglas and within his study; substantive and stylistic 
characteristics emerged within and across each opinion and formed ―internal dynamics.‖ 
Through this analysis, three types of arguments are used by a jurist: Argument from ideal, 
argument from rule, and argument from context (p. 233). These three hypothetical rhetorical 
genres focused the research to determine how jurists create a rationale for their argument. The 
first argument, argument from ideal, draws its warrant from natural law and self-evident and 
moral-denote principles such as justice and unalienable rights. The second argument, argument 
by rule, draws its warrant from legal positivism and the rule of stare decisis. The final argument, 
argument from context, draws its warrant based legal realism, societal goals and or pragmatic 
means resolved through litigation (p. 232). Through this scholarship, these arguments are in fact 
a basis of rhetorical debate within the Court, positioning critical inquiries into these legal 
opinions (Rodgers, p. 235). Similar to this analysis, other scholars have also focused on how the 
Supreme Court asserts itself through its legal opinions.  
William Murphy points out that ―we are so accustomed to thinking of the Constitution as 
law that we forget that first and foremost it is a political document‖ (1978). Amid this notion, 
communication scholars can do well by collaborating with other fields that examine the Supreme 
Court. In fact, numerous studies have documented how justices decide cases based on their 
political values and its empirical effects in society (Rhode and Spaeth 1976; Segal and Cover 
1989; Tate1981). Furthermore, political scientists have crafted a model for interpreting whether a 
prediction can be made by a jurist based on their ideological and political positions. This model 
is referred as the attitudinal model (Segal, Epstein, Cameron, & Spaeth, 1995). This model 
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articulates that a decision/vote by a justice can be predicted based on their political affiliation 
and ideological values. Furthermore, research has found that in a post-Warren Court era, justices 
are in fact more inclined to decide on ideological values rather than adhering to the principle of 
stare decisis (p. 821). These results, coupled with the notion that justices craft their opinions 
using rhetoric opens the door for more rhetorical examination of the Court. In one area, scholars 
have taken an ideological analysis of the Court. 
Hasian and Klinger found that at times the Court creates an ironic decision that in turn 
leads to a tragic future (Hasian and Klinger, 2002). The longest example of this ironic and tragic 
framework can be seen within the genealogical dimensions of the ―separate but equal‖ doctrine 
(p. 269). In Roberts v. The City of Boston, ―equal rights‖ became the tenor for educating young 
blacks in the city of Boston.  It is important to know how in the beginning of 19th century, the 
City of Boston was facing major divisions concerning integrating the schools. Though 
intermarriage between the two races was dissolved effectively in Boston (Kull, p. 32), the 
thought of educating the two races still seemed obscene. Therefore, black and white abolitionist 
cried out for ―equal rights‖ under the assumption of ―separating‖ the races in order to achieve 
―equality‖ (Hasain & Klinger, p. 277) In other words, the only option for blacks to receive an 
education was to do it by means of separate educational institutions. However, this decision in 
Roberts, to separate the races for equal treatment, created a tragic framework for the next century 
of debate concerning ―equality‖ among the races in America. This decision became one of many 
precedents that influenced Plessy v. Fergusson.  
In the after math of Roberts, an ideological framework surfaced. One, judges formulate 
decisions based on community values, even when they are inconsistent with their own personal 
views. Two, judges are bound to maintain the legal codification of a system that is inherently 
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racist (p. 277). This of course begs the question that when approaching the law, should we ask if 
the law has any substantive social progress, both materially and symbolically. In the end, 
advocates for the ―rule of law‖ may ignore the moral and political implications of making a 
decision (p. 280). Furthermore, this demonstrates that the notion of ―separate but equal‖ was a 
standard representing the ideological position of a community at a time, and for the most part 
revealed a progress. However, as time passed and the materialistic consequences became more 
severe and it was too late to reverse before Plessy. Of course Plessy in turn created a century of 
battle for equality until Brown v. Board of Education.  
Both Justice Brown in Plessy, and Chief Justice Shaw in Roberts, were simply codifying 
ideological positions that presupposed rhetorical figurations of broader and more complex 
constituencies (p. 276). This of course further elaborates how justices argue from a legal realism 
in order to achieve societal goals (Rodgers, p. 235). So it is understandable now how judges can 
codify a decision based on ideological values and create a devastating legal precedent for later 
generations. This analysis by Hasian and Klinger provides a basis for this analysis concerning 
Citizens United to emerge. Although this analysis is fruitful, there are other areas where 
rhetoricians have examined the Court. 
The field of rhetorical inquiry can also illuminate insight into how the Supreme Court 
offers a very rich text that produces a narrative form (Twigg, 1989, p. 1). The next step in 
rhetorical theory applied to the Court would be a conventional wisdom of the narrative 
framework (Bennett 1981; Fisher 1987; Pennignton & Hastie 1986; Hollihan Riley, & Freadhoff, 
1986). Returning to the concept of the ‗separate but equal‘ doctrine, a narrative also surfaces in 
both Plessy v. Fergusson and Brown v. Board of Education. What surfaces from these two cases 
is the concept that the Supreme Court constructs their arguments in a narrative framework by 
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rationalizing through history in order to support and then to strike down the ―separate but equal‖ 
doctrine (Twigg, p. 6). Furthermore, these arguments construct a present day reality that is 
grounded in historical reference. In other words, by using history, the Supreme Court can make 
the argument that this ‗doctrine‘ is either right or wrong. 
Given the conventional framework concerning narrative criticism, both Bennett and 
Fisher argue that narratives do not display realities but rather construct realities (Bennett, 1981; 
& Fisher, 1987). Therefore, public discourse, or rhetoric, is the central influence between the 
law—the construction of reality—and ideology—how the justices approach reality. Because of 
this notion coupled with the fact that the Court‘s responsibility is to interpret the Constitution, 
the process of creating arguments through a narrative construction can lend us to the ideology 
behind the Court. Because it is a reflection of American ideals and democracy, it could not be 
ever more important to understand motives by the Court.  
Korematsu v. United States was a decision that demonstrates how judicial opinions craft a 
story about the past, which vindicates judicial action in the present, and sets the stage for 
disastrous decision making in the future (Rountree, p. 20). This decision also demonstrates how 
grammatical strains can develop as rhetorical constructions of an action in one place and limit 
rhetorical opportunities for constructing motives in another act (p.6). Therefore, demonstrating 
why it is so important to conduct a rhetorical analysis of the Supreme Court because one motive 
at a certain place in time can effectively strain other decisions over time, causing conflict and 
rhetorical motives to clash. Amid how the Court is a rhetorical institution that asserts its 
decisions based on ideology and now understanding how the Court can effectively strain 
decision making and development due to the binding nature of the law, we have a conventional 
framework of how the examination of the Court can be done rhetorically.  
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Given how rhetorical scholars have examined Supreme Court opinions, not much 
literature has expanded the idea of how the Court uses ideology to decide its cases. Furthermore, 
how the ideology of the Court influences society. Because the Court is very much the institution 
that shapes our thoughts concerning political issues, it is worthwhile for rhetorical scholars to 
employ the ideograph onto Supreme Court opinions.   
The significance of living in a post Citizens United world can give fertile ground to study 
the Supreme Court ideologically. Understanding that this decision has sparked a large debate in 
many circles and causes dissonance among lawmakers and those who contribute to campaigns, it 
is reasonable to analyze the ideological standing of the Court in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010) by employing the ideograph. In order to analyze the 
decision, a methodological procedure needs to be laid out.   
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Chapter 3 - Method 
The previous literature uncovered how rhetorical scholarship has examined the decisions 
by the U.S. Supreme Court and how those decisions create some ideological implications. Amid 
this robust literature leading to some areas of ideological assumptions, rhetorical inquiry is left 
without an examination of the court‘s usage and creation of ideology. This clear omission leaves 
room for an ideographic analysis of a recent Supreme Court decision. In order to answer the 
previous research question, a description of a theoretical model that McGee proposes as the 
ideograph will be clearly defined. Furthermore, the artifact will also be addressed.  
 Ideograph 
McGee proposes a model to link ―ideology‖ and ―rhetoric‖ together in order to account 
for the mass consciousness of the public. This method provides critics the ability to establish 
abstract terms defined as ideographs. Ideographs are terms or words which operate in political 
discourse that initiate a high-order of abstraction representing a collective commitment to a 
particular but equivocal and ill-defined goal (p.15). It warrants the use of power, excuses for 
behavior, and guides beliefs and behaviors into channels easily recognized by a community as 
acceptable and laudable (p.15). Ideographs then are purely descriptive terms that conditions 
humans socially (p.8). Both Foss and McGee argue that ideographs function as a way of 
persuasion that conditions human thought patterns (p. 6). Unlike the rules of logic, where a 
person accepts a claim based on the argument‘s ability that prove the conclusion, ideographs 
‗force‘ an individual to accept them because they are conditioned to believe that ―liberty‖ has an 
obvious meaning and behaviorally self-evident. In other words, it is the process that humans are 
conditioned by language, like a boy learning the ABC‘s, that ideographs are created and in turn 
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resonate with its culture or community. Furthermore, McGee argues that ideology in practice is 
political language preserved in rhetorical documents with the capacity to dictate decisions and 
control public belief and behavior (p. 5).  
The primary goal of the ideological critic then is to discover and make visible the 
dominant ideology or ideologies embedded in an artifact (Foss, p. 241) by establishing 
specifiable ideographs. Ideographs appear both diachronically and synchronically, which in turn 
creates patterns of political consciousness (p. 5). In other words, an ideograph is grounded within 
its etymology—vertically—and its present usage—horizontally. These two operations of the 
ideograph need to be defined. However, before defining these two modes of operation, some 
basic assumptions Foss articulates about how to find and analyze an ideograph needs to be 
discussed.  
Foss defines two steps in order to trace and find ideographs within an artifact: identify the 
nature of an ideology and identify the strategies in support of that ideology (p. 244). Finding the 
nature of ideologies, a critic needs to answer questions that define membership, activities, goals, 
values and norms, positions and group relations, and finally resources of a culture or community. 
Questions like who we are, where are we from etc… express membership. Questions like why 
we do this or what we want to gain… express goals. Finally, questions like what is our social 
position and what are our needs… express position and resources of a community. Therefore, a 
critic begins to focus on a term such as ―liberty‖ by systematically answering these questions to 
determine if it is in fact an ideograph within the community. After determining this, a critic can 
then establish the specific guidelines a community uses to employ this ideology. A few strategies 
include the communicative genre, the number of individuals who accept this ideology, the 
content of the ideology etc… Because a critic is responsible for uncovering these inherent 
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ideologies, going through this process leads to the critical implications an ideology can have 
within a community. Because the definition, usage, and how to establish an ideograph is clearly 
articulated, the procedure of this research project can be laid out. However, before the procedure, 
addressing how the ideograph has developed in rhetorical scholarship is important.  
 Development of the Ideograph 
McGee first proposed the concept of the ideograph (McGee, 1980) and a number of 
scholars have continued the tradition (Condit 1993; Lucaites 1993; Cloud, 2004; McCann, 2007; 
Morrissey, 2008; Hayden, 2009; Kuypers & Althouse 2009). This concept links ―ideology‖ and 
―rhetoric‖ together in order for a critic to analyze the conscious of the public. The rhetorical use 
and examination of the ideograph according to McGee is to first, give a detail structure of the 
society‘s ideology, then to expose and analyze the diachronic structure of every ideograph in the 
society‖ (McGee, 1980). First, McGee discusses that doing a synchronic analysis considers how 
ideological suggestive words either associate with other words or undermine other ideological 
suggestive words. McGee identifies this approach as clusters or clashing. If an ideological 
suggestive word seems to operate in harmony with another word, then they are clusters. If the 
word seems to contradict or cause dissonance then they are clashing. The next area concerns the 
diachronic analysis, which is a vertical method of analysis. This approach considers how 
ideological suggestive words have changed over time. Furthermore, the examination of this 
approach can tell the critic whether a word has either expanded or contracted over time. In other 
words, does the word or phrase significance increased or decreased over time.  
Since the methodology was first established, a number of other scholars have employed 
the ideograph. For example, Morrissey explores how commercials stated in the campaign cycle 
of California concerning Proposition 8, employed the ideographic language of <equality>, and 
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how it was successful in that campaign cycle. This analysis covers the history of equality—
diachronic analyses—by examining how it was applied to Black Americans. By looking to the 
―separate but equal‖ doctrine, the author uncovered how Americans placated an egalitarian 
sentiment by promising <equality> (p. 7).  In hindsight, the ―equal‖ access was not equal at all. 
By building off of Lucaites and Condit (1993), Black Americans insisted on full equality and the 
author asserts that the ideograph of <equality> promoted the success of Prop 8 (emphasis added). 
This article displays in a miniature way of how to apply the ideograph diachronically. However, 
Kuypers, & Althouse also gives a clear insight into how the ideograph is applied.  
Kuypers, & Althouse explored how John Pym exploited the ideograph, <law>, in the 
House debates, and its relation to the opposition to the English Crown, Charles I, in the article 
―John Pym, Ideographs, and the Rhetoric of Opposition to the English Crown,‖ (p. 225). These 
scholars elaborate how the ideograph links ideology to discourse. Furthermore, this article 
demonstrates how ideographs develop in one particular time—synchronically—and how 
ideographs develop over time—diachronically. Because of the use of the ideograph, the authors 
find that Pym manipulated the ideograph <law>, also referred to as <fundamental law>, to 
rhetorically create a new political reality and unified audience (p. 240). Furthermore, Pym 
rhetorically harmonized the ideographs of <religion>, <justice>, and <Parliamentary privilege> 
(clustering) to unite factions in opposition to the alleged abuses of royal power through the usage 
of this ideograph <law> (p. 240). This was important for Pym to do because it helped solidify 
how the Parliament would regain power from the regime and the corruption of King Charles I. 
Though this demonstrates clearly how the ideograph can be applied to the rhetorical discourse in 
the House of Commons synchronically, the ideograph has been used and applied in other 
interesting areas as well.    
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McCann argues that the rhetorical strategies invoked by both sides of the death penalty 
constituted a tension between ―therapeutic‖ and ―material‖ justice through the usage of the 
ideograph <victim> in the article ―Therapeutic and Material <Victim> hood: Ideology and the 
Struggle for Meaning in the Illinois Death Penalty Controversy,‖ (p. 387). The article conveys 
that therapeutic hood is considered to be the suffering of the prison and death penalty system, 
which those who are on death row are in turn <victims> of this system (p. 387). The therapeutic 
portion of the author arguments is to solidify the liberal hegemony towards a philanthropic 
affinity for the afflicted and downtrodden <victims>. The author analyzed several documents 
that trace the debate of the death penalty in the state of Illinois to understand the rhetorical 
strategies and tension between the ideograph <victim>. The authors suggestion to the abolitionist 
movement against the death penalty is that they must construct the rhetorical device of <victim> 
and identify capital punishment as the most violent expression of a criminal justice system that 
consistently reproduces the stratifications of a capitalistic society (p. 395). This article, in its 
thought provoking way, demonstrates how we can apply the ideograph to specific artifacts and 
examine how it is done both diachronically and synchronically. The last two scholars have 
demonstrated how the ideograph can be applied to the traditional way of critical scholarship by 
examining text. However, the evolvement of the ideograph has also been flexible enough to be 
applied to the image.   
Hayden examines the 2004 March for Women‘s Lives that reinvigorates the debate over 
abortion in the article ―Revitalizing the Debate Between <Life> and <Choice>: The 2004 March 
for Women‘s Lives,‖ (p. 114). More specifically, the author examines how the ideograph 
<choice> significantly changes to match the strong influence of the ideograph <life>. The 
examination of these ideographs was unique in nature, as it departs from the textual frame of 
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reference to the image. The author in this article examines the March‘s banner by looking to the 
wording and what surrounded it (p. 116). The phrase of the march was ―March for Women‘s 
Lives‖ surrounded by choice, abortion, family planning etc… This image invoked the powerful 
ideograph of <life> while advocating the ideograph of <choice>. The author then argues that the 
fixed ideological meaning of <life> can be fixed to mean something else through image events. 
In this case, the ideograph of <life> became anew with a women‘s right to <choose>, further 
embedding the ideograph of <choice> in American society (p. 129). Given this analysis of the 
image, Dana Cloud, another rhetorical scholar, surfaced how the imagecan create serious 
political and ethical implications.  
Cloud establishes some critical implications in her article ―To Veil the Threat of Terror‖: 
Afghan Women and the <Clash of Civilizations> in the Imagery of the U.S. War on Terrorism 
on three levels: research possibilities, societal criticism, and foreign policy (p. 287). This article 
explores the role of widely circulated images of Afghans, with emphasis on Afghan women, in 
national news magazines and their web sites during the Afghanistan war, arguing that images of 
Afghan women and men establishes a binary opposition between white, Western, modern society 
and an abject foreign military action (p. 286). Additionally, the article documents the ways that 
the imagery of the war on terrorism justifies the imperial thrust of U.S. foreign policy. In other 
words, this binary creates a <clash of civilization> between Western society and the Other—
Afghanistan. The author uses Wrinkler and Edwards (1999) argument that images can function 
as ideographs because they are ―culturally grounded, summarizing, and authoritative terms that 
enact their meaning by expressing an association of cultural ideals and experiences in ever 
evolving and reifying form within the rhetorical environment‖ (p. 288) In the end, the author 
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asserts that the war on terror was exploited due to images that created irrational explanations 
between superior and inferior civilizations (p. 300).  
Given the basis of the ideograph, scholars have come to recognize the ideograph as tool 
to methodically examine text that perpetuates ideologies that are ill-defined but unite public 
communities towards a specifiable goal. Because ideographs are abstract in nature and incite raw 
emotions in the conscious of humans, the ideograph has developed to not only examine text but 
also the image. Furthermore, the ideograph has been used to determine how the usage of 
ideological suggestive words creates political, ethical, and even economic implications in 
society. 
   Procedure 
 Identifying the Nature and Strategies of an Ideograph 
Using Foss‘s approach can assist in establishing possible ideographs in Citizens United. 
The first step will be to identify the nature of the ideology and second will be to identify the 
strategies in support of the ideology. This will be done by examining the in dictum and holding 
statements within the decision. Secondly, identifying how the justices strategically supported the 
words or phrases will allow specifiable ideographs to be established. From here, the research can 
now address the two modes of analyzing ideographs.  
 Diachronic 
Because ideographs like <equality> do not have any empirical observation, they are only 
known because the meaning associated to the term is acceptable and believable by the 
community. Therefore, a person attaches meaning to the term when they are forced to make 
reference to its history and detailing the situations for which the word has been appropriately 
described (McGee, p. 10). McGee further articulates that communities make comparisons over 
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time and the communities establish an analog for the proposed present usage of the term. In other 
words, they become precedents and touchstones for judging the propriety of the ideograph in a 
current circumstance (p. 10). So the meaning of <equality>, for example, does not remain 
stagnant, because over time situations change and its usage will vary. As a result, the 
significance of <equality> can expand or contract over time. This principle of analysis, time, and 
how the meaning of terms contract or expand over time helps the critic to understand how a term 
with high importance now is based on the fact of its significance then. This analysis focuses 
mainly on the synchronic portion; however, the study will address the diachronic portion in the 
analysis and conclusion.  
 Synchronic 
Because of the nature of a diachronic analysis, a critic is left with an exhaustive account 
of specific ideographs development through time, without an account of how they operate or 
used presently. Because of this methodological gap of connecting ideology to rhetoric, a critic 
has to analyze an ideograph horizontally. This is called synchronically analyzing an ideograph. 
Amid ideographs are historically grounded, present day usage of ideographs, for example 
<confidentiality>, clashes with other ideographs, for example <rule of law> (p. 12). The 
examination of these two ideographs diachronically may demonstrate a constant relationship. 
However, because ideographs contract or expand due to present day usage, the two ideographs 
can clash as time passes, causing direct conflict within a community (p.13). This in turn can 
create serious rhetorical and practical implications in society. For example, during the Watergate 
scandal, Congress summoned President Nixon to hand over certain documents and tapes in sake 
of the <rule of law>. However, Nixon refused on the grounds of <confidentiality>, asking the 
American public to expand their understanding of <confidentiality>, altering the relationship 
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with the <rule of law>, making what appeared to be an illegal act acceptable. However, because 
there was no direct precedent the public or Congress could attach to <confidentiality>, especially 
as it concerns the President of the United States, the ideograph <rule of law> prevailed as the 
dominant ideology. Amid this clash, the significance of doing such an analysis increases when 
rhetorical documents are created that are supposed to control human behavior, i.e. Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission 558 U.S. 50 2010.  
 Artifact 
The purpose of this research project is to gain an understanding of how Supreme Court 
decisions work rhetorically and create significant implications in society. Conducting a 
synchronic analysis of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 558 U.S. 50 2010 will be 
the purpose of this paper. Doing an analysis of both in dictum and holding statements in both the 
majority and dissenting opinions can establish how particular ideographs have clustered or 
clashed together, altering these particular ideographs relationship, meaning, and operation in 
society forever. Given the basis of the method, now an analysis can take place concerning 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.  
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Chapter 4 - Analysis 
Two ideographs emerged after the examination of Citizens United. Because the rhetorical 
artifact is not a unanimous decision, it is clear that both the majority and dissenting opinions had 
to be analyzed. Conflicting viewpoints, arguments, and concepts emerged from the analysis. In 
order to establish what the ideographs were, Foss‘s approach was taken. Foss defines two steps 
in order to trace and find ideographs within an artifact: identify the nature of the ideology and 
identify the strategies in support of the ideology (p. 244). Finding the nature of ideologies, a 
critic needs to answer questions that define membership, activities, goals, values, group relations, 
and finally resources of a culture or community. This can be done by understanding the 
development and how the Supreme Court uses terms. The second step can be done by 
articulating the rhetorical strategies embedded within Citizens United. As a result of the analysis, 
<marketplace of ideas> and <corruption> emerged as the possible ideographs. Based on Foss 
first step, these ideographs are established by their historical record.  
In Abrams v. United States, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated the ―marketplace 
of ideas‖ as a way to promote a stronger democratic system. Furthermore, it was articulated 
again in Dennis v. United States by Justice Douglas. This idea became a model in the legal field. 
This model articulates that the best policy (or candidate in concern of this decision) will be 
accepted based on the viewpoints being allowed to compete within a ―marketplace.‖ Although 
the model promotes the flow of ideas into the political marketplace, it is important to understand 
that the model is neither liberal nor conservative. As a result of the prior definition that an 
ideograph is a precedent to how we judge current circumstances and can be used in a variety of 
ways, <marketplace of ideas> is established as an ideograph. In other words, an ideograph is not 
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anchored into a specific ideological position but rather is used to promote an ideological 
position. Like <freedom>, it can be used and interpreted in different ways; however, we use it in 
order to establish our ideological position. Based on this notion, the Court in several areas of the 
opinion use the phrase ―marketplace of ideas‖ as a way establish their ideological position. It is 
also important to note that this model was first denied in Abrams, but as time passed, the Court 
began to accept this model. An example of how this ideograph expanded can be seen in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio. This case, like many others that followed, demonstrated the growth of this 
ideograph. However, as stated in chapter 3, ideographs can expand or contract as time passes.  
Like Marketplace of ideas, Corruption is a strong word and appeals to fear in voters, 
lawmakers, and justices around the nation; however, is not anchored into a set ideological 
position. Rather corruption is used to promote an ideological position. As articulated in Chapter 
2, President Roosevelt initiated an effort to stop any appearance or actual <corruption> that 
corporations may bring about in an election cycle. Because of the historical action taken by 
President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905, it is expected then that this would be an ideograph. The 
usage of this ideograph was to maintain integrity of the political process and establish agency for 
natural persons. This can be no more evident than in Citizens United because of the amount of 
times this word was used and the level of rhetorical strategies to support this ideograph. Based 
on a broad scope of these two ideographs, the synchronic analysis can be carried out. This can be 
established by following Foss‘s second step by identifying the strategies that support the 
ideograph.  
This can be done by identifying and defining other terms the majority and dissenting 
opinion uses. The terms or words the majority uses are ―speech,‖ ―First Amendment,‖ and 
―Identity.‖ The terms or words the dissenting opinion uses are ―Integrity of the political process,‖ 
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―Tradition,‖ and ―First Amendment.‖ Given the context of these two ideographs, this chapter of 
the paper will be broken down into three sections. Examining how the <marketplace of ideas> 
was the central ideograph used by the majority will be the first section. The next section of this 
chapter will examine how the dissenters used <corruption>. The final section will show the 
rhetorical conflict between <marketplace of ideas> and <corruption>.   
 Marketplace of Ideas 
The central ideograph used by the majority was the <marketplace of ideas>, because their 
central argument was based on the notion that all ideas should be allowed to freely flow into the 
political debate. Furthermore, all voters should be exposed to all ideas, regardless of who is 
promoting those ideas. This can be noted in this passage: 
While some means of communication may be less effective than 
others at influencing the public in different contexts, any effort by 
the Judiciary to decide which means of communications are to be 
preferred for the particular type of message and speaker would 
raise questions as to the courts‘ own lawful authority. Substantial 
questions would arise if courts were to begin saying what means of 
speech should be preferred or disfavored (p.9). 
In this paragraph of the majority‘s opinion, they challenge the notion of regulating ―speakers‖ 
and the ―messages‖ they speak. Furthermore, this begins the majority‘s argument that it is 
unconstitutional to not allow all possible messages to enter the <marketplace of ideas>. 
However, before demonstrating how the Court uses the ideograph of <marketplace of ideas>, it 
is important to outline the rhetorical strategies they use to support this ideograph. This can be 
done by identifying and defining specifiable terms they use. The first term is ―speech.‖  
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 Speech 
Given the fact that the majority wishes to appeal to the highest ideal of participatory 
democracy, regardless of who is speaking, the majority had to answer the clear question 
concerning how corporations can actually ―speak.‖ In order to do this, the majority rhetorically 
creates ―speech‖ to be synonymous with ―electioneering communication.‖ This can be found in 
several areas of the opinion, but the majority mentions this notion in the beginning of the 
opinion: 
Federal law prohibits corporations and unions from using their 
general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for 
speech defined as an ―electioneering communication‖ or for speech 
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate (p.1). 
Electioneering communication is defined as when TV ads are purchased that promote the 
election or defeat of a candidate (p.3). The majority then uses this definition as a way to tie it 
under what is classified as ―speech.‖ It is obvious that corporations cannot physically talk or go 
to the polls, but the majority interprets these two terms as synonymous. By simply defining 
speech as electioneering communication, they open the door for corporations to actually ―speak.‖ 
Because of this rhetorical strategy, the main focus of this part of the analysis concerns how the 
majority notes ―corporations and unions…using their general treasury funds to make 
independent expenditures for speech.” By labeling electioneering communication as speech, the 
majority creates the issue of corporations‘ ability to participate in the political process a 
constitutional concern. With that said, there are a number of other areas the majority rhetorically 
opens the door for corporations to actually speak.  
In one part of the majority‘s opinion, the majority raises the issue of how the movie 
Hillary falls under a prior approach the Court created under the Federal Election Commission V. 
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Wisconsin Right To Life. This part of the majority‘s opinion, it is suggested that the movie is 
equivalent to express advocacy and is protected by prior precedents and the First Amendment. 
This can be noted in this passage:  
WRTL then found an unconstitutional application of §441b where 
the speech was not ―express advocacy or its functional equivalent.‖ 
551 U. S., at 481 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). As explained by 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE‘s controlling opinion in WRTL, the 
functional- equivalent test is objective: ―a court should find that [a 
communication] is the functional equivalent of express advocacy 
only if [it] is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than 
as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate‖ (p.7) 
A focal point of this text is where the majority states ―a court should find that [a communication] 
is…express advocacy only if [it] is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an 
appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.‖ This section is important because the majority 
articulates that the movie Hillary falls under this area of interpretation because it ―appeals to vote 
for or against a specific candidate.‖ The District Court, however, found that there is no 
reasonable interpretation of Hillary other than as an appeal to vote against Senator Clinton. The 
majority disagrees with this approach and argues that this is protected speech. Furthermore, a 
practical message that is important about this text is that the majority argues that the District 
Court departed from the prior precedent‘s purpose. This rhetorical strategy that the majority uses 
is a way to argue that the Court‘s legal jurisprudence has not changed since WRTL. The ironic 
point of the majority doing this is that the other decision‘s purpose was to restrict corporation‘s 
ability to speak, unlike Citizens United. This approach is sprinkled throughout the majority‘s 
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opinion. This is the first part where the majority articulates the issue concerning prior precedents 
and maintaining an important legal principle. The legal principle that is referred here is stare 
decisis, and the majority affirmed that this opinion will depart from prior cases, such as Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, by writing:  
In this case we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect, 
McConnell. It has been noted that ―Austin was a significant 
departure from ancient First Amendment principles,‖ Federal 
Election Comm‘n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 
490 (2007) (WRTL) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment). We agree with that conclusion and hold 
that stare decisis does not compel the continued acceptance of 
Austin. 
This section of the majority‘s opinion shows their motive to move away from prior decisions and 
completely overturn another decision. But in the wake of this rationale, the majority argues that 
it is actually maintaining traditional First Amendment values and jurisprudence by overturning 
some laws and decisions. This is of course a unique rhetorical strategy and it can be noted in this 
sentence: ―It has been noted that ―Austin was a significant departure from ancient First 
Amendment principles.‖ The simple fact that they used ―ancient First Amendment principles‖ to 
justify their reasoning to overturn Austin and part of McConnell, allows the majority to bypass 
the legal principle of stare decisis. This of course allows them to create rhetorical arguments to 
justify their rationale. This in turn begins to demonstrate their ideological position concerning 
campaign finance by corporations. By first defining what speech is, the majority moves on to 
discuss how electioneering communication is protected by the First Amendment. However, in 
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order to do this, the majority had to interpret the First Amendment in a different way than the 
dissenters.  
 First Amendment 
The most important duty of the Supreme Court is to ensure that the rights and liberties of 
the Constitution are granted to everyone. Within the First Amendment is the free speech clause. 
This clause prohibits any governmental intrusion concerning a citizen‘s right to speak. The 
Court, however, has determined that this clause is not absolute and some types of speech are less 
restricted than others. Furthermore, some speakers are placed in categories to determine the level 
of freedom they have to speak (Tedford & Herbeck). Because political speech enjoys the highest 
level of legal protection of all speech, the majority attempts to place ―electioneering 
communication‖ under political speech. This can be seen in this part of the opinion: 
Courts, too, are bound by the First Amendment. We must decline 
to draw, and then redraw, constitutional lines based on the 
particular media or technology used to disseminate political speech 
from a particular speaker. It must be noted, moreover, that this 
undertaking would require substantial litigation over an extended 
time, all to interpret a law that beyond doubt discloses serious First 
Amendment flaws. The interpretive process itself would create an 
inevitable, pervasive, and serious risk of chilling protected speech 
pending the drawing of fine distinctions that, in the end, would 
themselves be questionable. First Amendment standards, however, 
―must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than 
stifling speech.‖ (p. 9 – 10) 
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This text of the majority‘s opinion is important because it demonstrates how the majority is using 
the ―First Amendment‖ as a term to justify their decision making. Though it is their 
responsibility to uphold constitutional principles, the usage of the First Amendment becomes a 
rhetorical tool to justify their decision rather than a principle to guide their decision. This is no 
more evident than in this sentence: ―First Amendment standards, however, must give the benefit 
of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech.‖ This sentence demonstrates that the 
majority is using a ―standard‖ that the First Amendment creates to justify protecting any form of 
political speech. Furthermore, the majority justifies ―electioneering communication‖ as protected 
speech by stating: ―We must decline to draw, and then redraw, constitutional lines based on the 
particular media or technology used to disseminate political speech from a particular speaker.‖ 
Here, the majority argues that no matter the form of speech, it is still protected speech. 
Therefore, the First Amendment no longer becomes a measure that guides the justices to decide 
their cases but a tool to enforce an ideological position. The final category that the majority uses 
to promote corporations participation in the political process is ―identity.‖ This term is used 
heavily throughout the opinion in order to establish why and how massive entities like 
corporations and unions can freely participate in the political process. 
 Identity 
Because the majority is concerned about corporations‘ ability to participate in the 
political process, they had to address the fact that corporations are not ―living persons.‖ In order 
to carry out their ideological position, they rhetorically used the term ―identity‖ or ―identity of 
the speaker‖ as a way to include corporations under the umbrella term ―speaker‖ and be 
protected by the First Amendment. As a consequence, corporations and unions would have a 
chance to participate in the political process. This strategy intended on making an 
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undistinguishable difference between living persons and corporations. This rhetorical strategy 
solidifies a basic premise of their ideology, that the First Amendment protects any form of 
speech, regardless of the ―identity of the speaker.‖ This argument is heavily sprinkled throughout 
the majority‘s opinion and can be no better articulated than in this section of the opinion:  
The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make these 
categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the 
speaker and the content of the political speech. (p. 49) 
As this section of the majority‘s opinion demonstrates, the First Amendment becomes a tool to 
justify the majority‘s rationale; that political speech can be in any form or content and the 
identity of the speaker does not matter. This section of the opinion demonstrates how the 
majority rhetorically crafted terms and adjusted the purpose of the terms in order to establish 
their ideological position. This position is held in the belief that all ideas and information shall be 
distributed within the political <marketplace of ideas>.  
Because of the time spent allocated to justifying that the First Amendment does not care 
for the ―identity of the speaker,‖ it is worth looking at another section of the opinion. In this 
section of the opinion, the majority solely focuses on defining the ―identity of a speaker‖: 
The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether 
speech is protected. Corporations and other associations, like 
individuals, contribute to the ‗discussion, debate, and the 
dissemination of information and ideas‘ that the First Amendment 
seeks to foster‖ (quoting Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 783)). The Court 
has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations 
or other associations should be treated differently under the First 
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Amendment simply because such associations are not ―natural 
persons. (p.26) 
This section of the majority‘s opinion clearly articulates that the majority feels that the 
contribution to the debate and discussion is vital to the political process. Therefore, whoever is 
speaking and in what ways they are speaking do not matter. This can be noted in this sentence: 
―The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other 
associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such 
associations are not natural persons.‖ This of course addresses the sole fact that corporations are 
not natural persons, but also articulates that the First Amendment cannot treat these speakers any 
different than natural persons.‖ This is done by rhetorically tying corporations under the 
umbrella term ―identity of the speaker‖ and can be seen in this sentence: ―The identity of the 
speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. Corporations and other 
associations, like individuals, contribute to the ‗discussion…‖ One part of this text speaks 
directly to their central argument, which is how speakers contribute to the ‗discussion, debate, 
and the dissemination of information and ideas‘ that the First Amendment seeks to foster. The 
sole purpose and ideological position of the majority is to increase the flow of ideas within the 
political marketplace. Therefore, the critical ideograph that emerged from the analysis is 
<marketplace of ideas>. Examining the usage of this ideograph can establish the basis of the 
majority‘s ideology. 
 <Marketplace of ideas> 
 The dissenters recognized the majority‘s ideology and desire to appeal to the 
highest potential of the open <marketplace> in their own opinion:  
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Recognizing the weakness of a speaker-based critique of Austin, 
the Court places primary emphasis not on the corporation‘s right to 
electioneer, but rather on the listener‘s interest in hearing what 
every possible speaker may have to say. The Court‘s central 
argument is that laws such as §203 have ―deprived [the electorate] 
of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function,‘…and 
this, in turn, ―interferes with the ‗open marketplace‘ of ideas 
protected by the First Amendment,‖ (p.79) 
This is important to point out because it demonstrates how the majority was forcefully making 
their position known. Though the speaker‘s identity is a critical component of their argument, it 
is only a supporting term to establish their central argument, to open the <marketplace of ideas>. 
In this section of the paper, there are a few areas where dissecting the usage of this ideograph, 
<marketplace of ideas>, can allow a clear understanding of the majority‘s ideology.  
The first area of concern is how the majority wanted to make a clear distinction between 
two marketplaces. These two marketplaces are the economic and political marketplace. This 
rhetorical strategy is to create an understanding that all speakers are in fact equal. However, 
because the empirical fact that corporations have substantially more resources than an individual 
and is a critical part to the dissenter‘s argument, the majority had to address this fact.  
Austin sought to defend the antidistortion rationale as a means to 
prevent corporations from obtaining ―an unfair advantage in the 
political marketplace‘ ‖ by using ―resources amassed in the 
economic marketplace.‘ ‖ (p.34) 
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This section articulates the concern of an unfair advantage in the political marketplace that the 
dissenters and past precedents attempted to address. However, because the majority already 
established what is speech, First Amendment‘s protection of that speech, and the irrelevance of 
the speaker‘s identity, it is important now to allow all ideas to flow in the political marketplace. 
They further argue that regardless of position in the economic marketplace, every speaker uses 
the economic marketplace in order to participate in the political marketplace.  
All speakers, including individuals and the media, use money 
amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech. The 
First Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was 
enabled by economic transactions with persons or entities who 
disagree with the speaker‘s ideas. (p. 35).  
Asserting the fact that all speakers use resources within the economic marketplace, the implied 
notion in this section is that all speakers are equal. Because all speakers are equal, the 
<marketplace of ideas> suffers to a great degree by limiting any speakers from participating. The 
only way the majority can overrule Austin is to point out that this law restricts the flow of ideas 
within the political marketplace. By clearly stating ―Austin interferes with the ―open 
marketplace‖ of ideas‖ (p. 38), the majority demonstrates how strong an ideograph can develop 
and influence the law.  
Another rhetorical strategy the majority employs the ideograph of <marketplace of ideas> 
can be seen in this section:  
When the FEC issues advisory opinions that prohibit speech, 
―[m]any persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden 
(and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-
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case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected 
speech—harming not only themselves but society as a whole, 
which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.‖ 
protected by the First Amendment. (p. 19).  
The important part of this section is when the majority declares that the issued opinions given by 
the FEC ―deprives the <marketplace of ideas> protected by the First Amendment.‖  In this 
section, the ideograph functions as a way to demonstrate how a prior case breaks First 
Amendment free speech protection. Because the <marketplace of ideas> serves as an ideal by 
which the First Amendment protects, the majority again uses this ideograph as a measure to 
promote this ideal.  
As a result, the majority justifies their decision using the ideograph <marketplace of 
ideas>. Their ideology emerges from using this ideograph. It is evident that the majority of the 
justices were concerned about democracy functioning to its highest order. In order to justify this 
ideology, words such as ―speech‖, ―First Amendment‖, and ―identity‖ allowed the ideograph 
<marketplace of ideas> to become the catalyst to promote their ideology. Because the decision 
has a dissenting viewpoint, dissecting it in its entirety is important. In the next section, it will be 
important to examine how the ideograph <corruption> established the dissenter‘s rationale and 
ideology.  
 Corruption 
Because the Court is a rhetorical institution that operates democratically, there typically 
is always an opposing opinion drafted from the majority. It is vital then to understand the 
rhetorical arguments drafted in the opposing opinion in Citizens United. Within both the majority 
and dissenting opinion, <corruption> is used a number of times. In fact, corruption is used in the 
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entire opinion over a 100 times. The significance and usage of the word solidifies the central 
argument that the dissenters wish to employ. That corruption will increase as a result of this 
decision. Therefore, the word <corruption> becomes the central ideograph used by the 
dissenters. Examining the usage of <corruption> can be found in many areas of the dissenting 
opinion. However, one section articulates the dissenters‘ viewpoint very well:  
The governmental interest in preventing both actual corruption and 
the appearance of corruption of elected representatives has long 
been recognized,‖ the unanimous Court observed, ―and there is no 
reason why it may not . . . be accomplished by treating . . . 
corporations . . . differently from individuals. (p. 46) 
It is obvious that the dissenters want to stress how previous Courts and lawmakers have 
attempted at all costs to curb corruption. However, like the majority, the dissenters used other 
terms to build a logical argument around this ideograph. The other terms that will need to be 
examined in this section of the analysis will be ―integrity of the political process,‖ ―tradition,‖ 
and also the ―First Amendment.‖ All of these terms were used by the dissenters in order to justify 
why they must curb <corruption>. So this part of the chapter will also be broken into three 
sections. Each section will be dedicated to examining how each term supports and builds up to 
the ideograph <corruption>.  
 Integrity of the Political Process  
The opposite of <corruption> is ―integrity.‖ Examining how the dissenters rhetorically 
use ―integrity of the political process‖ will be critical to the analysis. In a number of areas, they 
use this term to justify why this decision cannot be ruled this way. This is articulated in this 
section of the dissenting opinion:  
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BCRA, we found, is faithful to the compelling governmental 
interests in ―preserving the integrity of the electoral process, 
preventing corruption, . . .‖ (p.50) 
As a rhetorical strategy, the dissenters place integrity and <corruption> next to one another. This 
rhetorical strategy plays up the good over the evil. In many of the passages within the opinion, 
the dissenters focus on the issue of <corruption> rather than integrity. This is driven by the fact 
that corporations can bankroll the political process and create an image of <corruption>. Because 
of this, the dissenters first needed to address the duties of the Court and lawmakers in preserving 
the ―integrity of the political process.‖  
In one such area, the dissenters boldly state ―The Court‘s ruling threatens to undermine 
the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation‖ (p. 4). ―Integrity‖ is based on the premise 
of voter perception. By stating this, they attempt to make it clear that all elected institutions will 
appear to lose ―integrity‖ with voters. The dissenters are then concerned about the issue of voters 
perceiving <corruption> in the political process. Though in this next section, the dissenters did 
not use the term integrity. However, they point out the clear indication of how voters may lose 
―faith‖ within the democratic process:  
At stake in the legislative efforts to address this threat is therefore 
not only the legitimacy and quality of Government but also the 
public‘s faith therein, not only ―the capacity of this democracy to 
represent its constituents [but also] the confidence of its citizens in 
their capacity to govern themselves,‖…―Take away Congress‘ 
authority to regulate the appearance of undue influence and ‗the 
cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize 
48 
 
the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.‘ 
(p. 60). 
As noted within this passage, the dissenters attempt to point out how public perception of a 
working government is vital. They use the phrase ―integrity of the political process‖ to point out 
how vital this perception is to the public. Because ―integrity‖ is the goal of a democratic society, 
it will be obvious in the following passages that the dissenters‘ usage of the ideograph 
<corruption> is meant to identify the great dangers to democracy as a result of the majority‘s 
ruling. The next section will address another term the dissenters used in order to support the 
ideograph <corruption>. This section will be dedicated to examining the usage of ―tradition.‖  
 Tradition 
In this section, ―tradition‖ is understood as an umbrella term to include, ―framers,‖ 
―precedents,‖ and ―stare decisis.‖ Throughout the opinion, the dissenters‘ used a variety of terms 
to mean the same thing, ―tradition.‖ Furthermore, their objective in this sense is to undermine the 
initiative taken on by the majority and point out their failure to obtain the law. This can be no 
more evident than in this statement:  
A century of more recent history puts to rest any notion that 
today‘s ruling is faithful to our First Amendment tradition. At the 
federal level, the express distinction between corporate and 
individual political spending on elections stretches back to 1907,… 
(p. 42) 
The rhetorical strategies in this passage of the dissenters‘ opinion point out the fact that the 
nation‘s laws distinguishing a difference between corporations and individuals have been 
established for over a century. Furthermore, it asserted that the majority has departed radically 
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from how the First Amendment has been interpreted for over a century. In effect, the majority is 
claimed to have lost sight of tradition. Other areas, the dissenters‘ attempt to make this point is 
by pointing to legal principles, such ―stare decisis.‖ 
As the dissenters‘ want to establish a central argument around <corruption>, they of 
course appeal to how past Courts and law makers have attempted to curb <corruption>. No other 
legal principle is clear on ―tradition‖ or letting the rule stand than stare decisis. In this next 
passage, the dissenters boldly call out the majority on their failure to obtain this principle:  
The final principle of judicial process that the majority violates is 
the most transparent: stare decisis. I am not an absolutist when it 
comes to stare decisis, in the campaign finance area or in any 
other. No one is. But if this principle is to do any meaningful work 
in supporting the rule of law, it must at least demand a significant 
justification, beyond the preferences of five Justices, for 
overturning settled doctrine. (p. 17). 
Examining this portion of the dissenters‘ opinion, it is important to point out the section where 
the dissenters note ―But if this principle is to do any meaningful work in supporting the rule of 
law, it must at least demand a significant justification, beyond the preferences of five Justices, 
for overturning settled doctrine.‖ By rhetorically using the phrase ―settled doctrine‖ and how the 
majority refuses to uphold this principle, they are attempting to demonstrate the troubled nature 
of this decision and its departure from tradition. Furthermore, the use of this term underscores 
how the majority refuses to uphold legal principles, settled doctrine, and maintain legislative and 
judicial ―tradition.‖ The dissenters display such an anxiety in this passage of the dissenting 
opinion:  
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It is all the more distressing that our colleagues have manufactured 
a facial challenge, because the parties have advanced numerous 
ways to resolve the case that would facilitate electioneering by 
nonprofit advocacy corporations such as Citizens United, without 
toppling statutes and precedents. Which is to say, the majority has 
transgressed  yet another ―cardinal‖ principle of the judicial  
process: ―[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary  not 
to decide more,‖ (p. 14) 
When the dissenters rhetorically use phrases like ―transgressed a cardinal principal,‖ they point 
out the failure by the majority to remain ―traditional.‖ With all the rhetorical messages embedded 
within this decision, it points to the ideological position of the dissenters, to curb all 
<corruption>. The dissenters point out that even the Court itself is bound to maintain ―tradition‖ 
and ―integrity.‖ The opposite of such is <corruption>. As a result, the dissenters call out the 
majority in a way to appear corrupt. In the final section, the dissenters use the ―First 
Amendment.‖ Unlike the majority, the dissenters use the ―First Amendment‖ as a guiding 
principle, not a concrete tool.  
 First Amendment  
Because the Court itself is bound to the Constitution, it is obvious that both sides of the 
argument will attempt to use the First Amendment. The distinction however, is how each side 
approaches the First Amendment. The majority believes the First Amendment is a concrete and 
absolute principle. It is a belief in the highest ideal with no consideration about real world 
implications. The dissenters on the other hand, approach the First Amendment as a guiding 
principle. A principle that establishes freedoms, but with the consideration of the damaging 
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affects that too much freedom can create for the public‘s welfare. This is no more evident than in 
this sentence of the dissenters‘ opinion: ―The notion that the First Amendment dictates an 
affirmative answer to that question is, in my judgment, profoundly misguided‖ (p.1). It is clear 
that the dissenters want to point out the misguided path that the majority has taken when 
interpreting the First Amendment. This is not the only area where they point out this notion:  
The basic premise underlying the Court‘s ruling is its iteration, and 
constant reiteration, of the proposition that the First Amendment 
bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker‘s identity, including 
its ―identity‖ as a corporation. While that glittering generality has 
rhetorical appeal, it is not a correct statement of the law. (p. 1-2). 
The dissenters point out in this passage how rigidly the majority sees the First Amendment. 
Furthermore, points out how the majority uses rhetorical appeals to argue their case. While this 
may be true, it is evident that both sides of the argument are using rhetorical appeals. While one 
appeals to an ideal, the other appeals to fear. In essence, dissenters appeal to a possible <corrupt> 
government to carry out their argument. What is unique about the dissenters‘ approach is the 
appeal to fear in all areas of their opinion, including how the majority approaches the First 
Amendment.  
Given the prior notion, Supreme Court decisions also have comments made within 
footnotes. Though the footnotes are not law, they are areas that justify their logic. Because of 
this, examining these footnotes are also important. In one particular footnote, the dissenters again 
point out their difference of viewing the First Amendment with the majority:  
There is nothing perplexing about the matter, because we are not 
similarly situated to our colleagues in the majority. We do not 
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share their view of the First Amendment. Our reading of the 
Constitution would not lead us to strike down any statutes or 
overturn any precedents… (p. 16). 
In this passage, there is a fundamental difference between the majority and the dissenters 
concerning the First Amendment. The majority sees fit to overturn a century of law and 
precedents, while the dissenters see opposite. While, their claims to First Amendment rights are 
different, the pivotal concern is how the following terms cluster around the central ideograph 
<corruption>. The final part of this section will address how the dissenters‘ arguments centered 
around <corruption>.  
 <Corruption> 
As both sides rhetorically created their arguments, one thing is obvious, it is centered on 
regulation. Because the majority feels our democracy should reach its highest potential and every 
speaker should be allowed to speak into the <marketplace of ideas>, the dissenters are concerned 
that by allowing every potential speaker may <corrupt> our democracy. Examining how the 
dissenters approach this issue of regulation through the usage of the ideograph <corruption> will 
be important.  
One of the first areas the dissenters point out is the issue of ―integrity.‖ What they do next 
is point out how the majority‘s ruling will do the exact opposite of ―preserving integrity.‖ It will 
<corrupt> our democracy. This was articulated in this passage of the dissenters‘ opinion:  
It is enough to say that the Act was primarily driven by two 
pressing concerns: first, the enormous power corporations had 
come to wield in federal elections, with the accompanying threat of 
both actual corruption and a public perception of corruption (p.42) 
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This passage is referring to the Tillman Act. This Act, established in 1907, was initiated by 
President Roosevelt in his State of the Union Address. The effort brought on by that Congress 
and the Administration was to curb the power that corporations can use during elections. The 
sole purpose was to stop the threat of actual <corruption> and perception of <corruption> by 
voters. It is clear that in this context, the ideograph <corruption> is critical to the development of 
their arguments. What makes the ideograph <corruption> so powerful is its long history in the 
Courts and legislatures. Many laws and precedents have been established to curb any type of 
<corruption>. Because of this, the dissenters valiantly use <corruption> throughout their opinion. 
In another passage, they appeal to the long history established by the federal system:  
While it is true that we have not always spoken about corruption in 
a clear or consistent voice, the approach taken by the majority 
cannot be right, in my judgment. It disregards our Constitutional 
history and the fundamental demands of a democratic society. (p. 
57).  
In this statement, the dissenters‘ appeal to the historical element that prior Courts had already 
established. Furthermore, it violates the ―fundamental demands of a democratic society.‖ Their 
rhetorical strategy is to build on other terms that were defined earlier in this paper, while 
promoting the ideograph <corruption>. <Corruption> is then of course considered an ideograph 
because of its abstract nature while promoting a clear effort by a class of people. Furthermore, 
because both sides acknowledge there is little evidence of actual <corruption> within the 
political process due to increase of money by corporations. This further demonstrates why 
<corruption> is an ideograph and why it is so heavily used by the dissenters. However, though 
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there is little statistical evidence of actual <corruption>. One ploy the dissenters use is anecdotal 
evidence. As a result, in one passage the dissenters put a face to <corruption>:  
In that case, Don Blankenship, the chief executive officer of a 
corporation with a lawsuit pending before the West Virginia high 
court, spent large sums on behalf of a particular candidate, Brent 
Benjamin, running for a seat on that court. ―In addition to 
contributing the $1,000 statutory maximum to Benjamin‘s 
campaign committee, Blankenship donated almost $2.5 million to 
‗And For The Sake Of The Kids,‘ ‖ a…corporation that ran ads 
targeting Benjamin‘s opponent… ―This was not all. Blankenship 
spent, in addition, just over $500,000 on independent expenditures 
. . . ‗ ―to support . . . Brent Benjamin.‖ ‘ ‖…Applying its common 
sense, this Court accepted petitioners‘ argument that Blankenship‘s 
―pivotal role in getting Justice Benjamin elected created a 
Constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias‖ when 
Benjamin later declined to recuse himself from the appeal by 
Blankenship‘s corporation…―Though n[o] . . . bribe or criminal 
influence‖ was involved, we recognized that ―Justice Benjamin 
would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his 
extraordinary efforts to get him elected… ―The difficulties of 
inquiring into actual bias,‖ we further noted, ―simply underscore 
the need for objective rules,‖…—rules which will perforce turn on 
the appearance of bias rather than its actual existence. (p. 68) 
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In this passage of the dissenters‘ opinion demonstrates an actual case that reflects <corruption>. 
This rhetorical strategy is to use anecdotal evidence to demonstrate the ―real‖ problems that can 
exist by this decision. Furthermore, it promotes the deep effort held by the Court to curb any 
<corruption>, regardless of actual or perception. Therefore, the central ideograph and driving 
rhetorical influence is <corruption>.  
I have argued how this ideograph plays out in the dissenters‘ opinion. However, this 
ideograph collides with the majority‘s ideograph. Not only because Citizens United was decided 
by a simple majority, but because of the content within both opinions contains sharp contrast. 
Though it is sometimes unnoticeable how ideographs come to collide until they actually do, it 
makes sense by the rhetorical arguments crafted within each opinion that they do. The following, 
and final section, will discuss how these two ideograph played out in this entire decision. 
Following this last section will be the final chapter. This chapter will address what does this 
mean for rhetorical scholars, lawyers, politicians, and ordinary citizens.  
Clash of Marketplace of ideas and Corruption 
After analyzing the opinion, these two ideographs collide. As a critic, when examining 
text as these, it is important to understand what it is meant by ideographs colliding. Ideographs 
collide when competing viewpoints seem to be in a ―toggle war.‖ In other words, in Citizens 
United, there seems to appear a tipping point of interpretation when it concerns campaign 
finance. This tipping point surrounds these two ideographs, <marketplace of ideas> and 
<corruption>. The result of these two ideographs colliding shows the tension between competing 
ideological beliefs. It is vital to address this tipping point because going forward, society‘s 
ideological position can drastically change. What makes these two ideographs colliding is the 
larger issue at stake.  
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On one hand, the majority attempts to balance the playing field in the democratic system. 
In order to do this, they use the <marketplace of ideas> phrase that is protected by the First 
Amendment. This allowed corporations and unions to participate in the political process. 
Virtually being ―equal‖ to living persons. On the other hand, the dissenters acknowledge the long 
effort placed by past Courts and lawmakers who felt that the participation by corporations would 
<corrupt> the democratic system. Because of the diachronic analysis mentioned in the method 
section, it is obvious how one ideograph, <marketplace of ideas>, has grown over the years. 
When this ideograph was first articulated by Justice Holmes, it was not an acceptable idea. In 
fact, the Court at that time felt any utterance that would cause a tendency for violence is not 
protected by the First Amendment. Throughout the years within the Court, ideas promoted by 
many speakers have grown to be protected. As a result, the Court began to accept this ideology 
and push towards an open <marketplace of ideas>. The result in this case demonstrates how an 
ideograph can expand and develop over time. The result, however, is that it will eventually bump 
up another ideological position in society. Within in Citizens United, the <marketplace of ideas> 
ideograph collided with <corruption>.  
Like the justices on the Court in Abrams v. United States, they wanted to stop any sort of 
violence or <corruption> that will affect military action during war time. As it pertains to 
corporations, for over a century, lawmakers and justices felt the need to not only distinguish 
corporations from individuals, but also limit the power corporations can yield in an election. The 
sole driving force is to limit or curb any type of <corruption>. By examining past records, the 
effort to stop <corruption> by corporations was the ideological position of society. As a result, 
the term <corruption>, whether that be actual or appearance, was the ideograph used to drive 
lawmakers and justices to stop corporations participating in the political process. Because of 
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<corruption>‘s long history in the federal system and the legal principles that bind Supreme 
Court Justices, it would be obvious that this ideograph would be used in Citizens United. 
However, due to the large growth, and of course composition of the Court, <marketplace of 
ideas> expanded to such an extent to push out the ideological position once held in <corruption>. 
In Citizens United, not only do these ideographs collide with one another, but one in fact 
forces another ideograph to contract. Though it is obvious that the composition of the Court has 
changed, it does not excuse the rhetorical arguments used by the justices to defend their ideology 
and its effects on society‘s ideological position. In a few areas, it is obvious these two ideographs 
collide:  
(―The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars 
for political favors‖); id., at 498. The fact that speakers may have 
influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that 
these officials are corrupt: (p. 43) 
This passage of the majority‘s opinion demonstrates how the two ideographs work against one 
another. Though in this passage, the majority does not directly use the ideograph <marketplace 
of ideas>, the passage still eludes this premise by noting ―speakers access.‖ The concern in this 
passage is not that a speaker has access, even more so than a natural human, but based on that 
notion alone does not mean a speaker is <corrupt>. The majority seeks to reveal that it is more 
important for every speaker to have access rather worry about <corruption>. The access the 
majority is referring to concerns the <marketplace of ideas> and lawmakers. These two 
ideographs colliding are also present within the dissenting opinion:  
The Court‘s central argument is that laws such as §203 have ― 
‗deprived [the electorate] of information, knowledge and opinion 
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vital to its function,‘…and this, in turn, ―interferes with the ‗open 
marketplace‘ of ideas protected by the First Amendment,‖…There 
are many flaws in this argument. If the overriding concern depends 
on the interests of the audience, surely the public‘s perception of 
the value of corporate speech should be given important weight. 
That perception today is the same as it was a century ago when 
Theodore Roosevelt delivered the speeches to Congress that, in 
time, led to the limited prohibition on corporate campaign 
expenditures that is overruled today…The distinctive threat to 
democratic integrity posed by corporate domination of politics was 
recognized at ―the inception of the republic‖ and ―has been a 
persistent theme in American political life‖ ever since. Regan 302. 
(p. 79). 
Again, in this passage of the dissenters‘ opinion, the two ideological positions clash. Though it is 
obvious they do not use <corruption>, they elude to that effect by discussing the publics 
―perception‖ concerning corporate speech for over a century. Furthermore, it is clear they 
demonstrate what the central argument and ideograph used by the majority.  
By examining both areas of the majority and the dissenting opinion, the rhetorical 
strategies used by each side attempts to justify their ideology can be noted in these two 
ideographs. By showing both ideographs against one another, good v. evil for example, we as a 
reader are forced to accept one over the other. In Citizens United, it is obvious that the 
ideological position that must be accepted in <marketplace of ideas>. This further stresses why 
rhetorical scholars must examine judicial opinions. Simply because of the power the Supreme 
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Court has and the purpose of the law, regulating human behavior and in many cases their 
ideological perspective of the world.  
Because this case is a landmark decision, many of the implications that will follow are 
unknown. However, as a rhetorical critic, doing an ideological analysis of the opinion can help 
draw possible implications. The following chapter will address those implications and possible 
conclusions from this given decision.  
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
Though the Supreme Court is only one branch of the United States Government, it serves 
as the ultimate interpreter of Constitutional principles and the civil rights of the American 
people. Because our decisions in this world are heavily influenced by both rhetoric and ideology, 
there are major implications to consider when these decisions bind citizens to behave in a certain 
way, such as the law. This alone provides rhetorical scholars the avenue to scrutinize and draw 
possible implications from decision making by the Supreme Court, like in Citizens United.  The 
rhetorical usage within Citizens United provided this analysis the ability to articulate both the 
majority and dissenting ideological position. By establishing two ideographs, this analysis came 
to understand how basic and abstract concepts can heavily dictate the Court‘s decision making. 
Furthermore, this analysis provides one piece to the larger scholarship concerning the Supreme 
Court and will help other scholars begin to understand how ideology, rhetoric, and the law 
overlap. 
To rhetorical scholars, a few implications from this analysis may be salient. These 
implications can be drawn on three levels: legal, practical, and rhetorical. One, it is only 
reasonable that significant dissonance will occur within the legal community. This is because of 
the given collision between the two ideographs and amount of weight American society gives to 
the law. This is because after a century of lawmakers, lawyers, policy makers, and business 
owners viewed corporate political activity in one way now has to change their perspective. 
Though the law is only a rhetorical product of a lawmaking institution, it binds citizens to think 
and behave in a certain way. Given the facts of this case, regardless of how citizens may feel 
about corporations participating in the political process, they are going to have to accept their 
activity now. Further elaborating this point, lawyers and lawmakers will now have to believe that 
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corporate participation in the political process is a civil right granted by the Constitution. This is 
a major step away from America‘s long history of barring corporate activity.  
The second implication from this ruling concerns the amount of money being spent 
during campaign cycles will increase. Citizens United allowed corporations to have the same 
freedoms that individuals have when it comes to using personal expenditures. Prior to this 
decision, individuals could literally go bankrupt by using all their money to help elect or defeat a 
candidate. Now that corporations and unions enjoy this freedom, it is only logical to expect that 
the amount of money being spent during an election will increase dramatically. This was even 
noticeable in the 2010 mid-term election. During this election, over $3.98 billion was spent on 
campaign ads and materials. This is by far the most expensive mid-term election in history 
(Levinthal, 2010).  The next Presidential election is already underway and it is logically expected 
to be the most expensive election in history. In fact, President Obama has already made a pledge 
to reach $1 billion dollars in campaign fundraising (Epistein and Thrush, 2011). Citizens United 
will have far reaching implications that we may not be able to measure for years to come. 
However, Citizens United provides rhetorical scholars a basis in understanding the Supreme 
Court. 
Because the Supreme Court is a rhetorical institution, answering the research question 
can draw a rhetorical implication on a theoretical basis. This implication concerns how scholars 
in the future may approach the Supreme Court when deciding cases that concern the free speech 
clause. After examining both opinions in Citizens United, understanding how ideology plays 
within the Supreme Court concerning the free speech clause can be articulated through a 
dichotomized framework. This framework emerged as a result from analyzing the ideographs 
and their usage within Citizens United. The ideographs then became a tool to uncover the 
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underline ideological conflict and positions concerning the freedom of speech clause. This 
framework can be articulated through by both ―Equality‖ and ―Democracy.‖ These two ideals 
can be examined in a number of areas within Citizens United. However, first it is important to 
understand which opinion appealed to which ideal.  
The majority opinion appealed to ―Democracy.‖ The majority‘s opinion had an attempt to 
fulfill the perfect ideals of ―Democracy.‖ In one area of the majority‘s opinion this notion is 
established:  
The First Amendment underwrites the freedom to experiment and 
to create in the realm of thought and speech. Citizens must be free 
to use new forms, and new forums, for the expression of ideas. The 
civic discourse belongs to the people, and the Government may not 
prescribe the means used to conduct it. (p. 57) 
Within this passage, the majority uses rhetoric to indicate their true ideological position on this 
issue. This ideological position concerns that any government regulation should never influence 
the potential growth of ―democracy.‖ Reexamining the literature established earlier, it is obvious 
that a primary goal of the Supreme Court concerning free speech is to increase ―democracy.‖ 
The dissenting opinion also provides scholars a way to understand another ideological 
position of the Court. This ideological position concerns ―Equality.‖ While the majority wanted 
to erase specifiable distinctions between corporations and natural persons, this part of the 
framework is to establish an equal playing field among possible speakers. This part of the 
framework concerns how the dissenters were weary of natural person‘s ability to engage within 
the political process now that powerful corporations have the same liberties as they do. This is 
established by the simple notion of the two marketplaces mentioned earlier, economic and 
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political. Because of the massive access corporations have within the economic marketplace, 
unlike natural persons, there is a significant disparity between the two. As a result, the dissenters 
used rhetoric to establish the notion of the inequality that the ruling in Citizens United will 
create.  This ideological position can be seen as an ideal of the Court in many recent and 
historical cases, i.e. Brandenburg v. Ohio. At any rate, though this may have been the losing 
ideological position in Citizens United, this can be seen in several areas of the dissenting 
opinion, such as in this passage:   
Consequently, when corporations grab up the prime broadcasting 
slots on the eve of an election, they can flood the market with 
advocacy that bears ―little or no correlation‖ to the ideas of natural 
persons or to any broader notion of the public good, … The 
opinions of real people may be marginalized. ―The expenditure 
restrictions of [2 U. S. C.] §441b are thus meant to ensure that 
competition among actors in the political arena is truly competition 
among ideas.‖ (p.81).  
This passage indicates how the dissenters view a distinct difference between corporations and 
living persons. Furthermore, stresses why the dissenters want ―Equality‖ among all speakers. 
This is simply because of the fact that those natural persons‘ voices will be marginalized due to 
the large access corporations will now have by spending their money.  
These competing ideological positions challenge scholars to further examine the 
complexities of the Supreme Court. Citizens United demonstrated these viewpoints and this 
study examined a battle between the competing ideological positions that collided. Though the 
Court for most of its existence has attempted to maintain both ―Democracy‖ and ―Equality‖ in 
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perfect harmony, Citizens United tipped the balance against ―equality.‖ As a result, this 
framework will assist future scholars in rhetorical criticism and other fields when it concerns the 
Court‘s decision making through an ideological framework.  
Though this research was able to provide a basis in understanding how the Supreme 
Court is a rhetorical and ideological institution, there were a number of limitations. The first 
limitation concerns the methodology. Because of the extent to which Supreme Court decisions 
have been made concerning campaign finance and corporate activity, this analysis only took on a 
synchronic analysis. Though this analysis yielded fruitful criticism and results, further research 
will have to be done that includes a diachronic analysis. Including a diachronic analysis will 
establish the historical significance of both ideographs, <marketplace of ideas> and 
<corruption>. This analysis only established that in Citizens United they were significant. 
Examining other cases, other results may be yielded. Adding depth to this study will further 
establish the dichotomized framework. The second limitation concerns the actual method itself.  
While McGee‘s proposed ideographic methodology address how text can perpetuate an 
ideology, the method does not tell the motivating factors or predict future ideological outcomes. 
This method intent is to be subjective rather than objective. However, considering this notion, it 
is well worth noting that this methodology can be used to bridge how scholars in Political 
Science and Communication Studies approach the Supreme Court. This is because there is 
already a model in Political Science titled the Attitudinal Model. This model articulates that 
scholars can predict the outcome of a decision based on the justices conservative or liberal 
tendencies (Walker, 2010). Because this methodology concerns the explanation of an outcome, it 
can be used as a working method with the Attitudinal Model to bridge how ideology can both 
predict why an outcome occurred and how ideology influences the outcome.  
65 
 
Another limitation to note is that while this study examines the Court as a whole, it is 
important to state that this ruling came about because the composition of the Court. As a result, if 
the composition was different, it is very likely a different outcome would have occurred. While 
this is an important fact, it only underscores the importance to examine the Court. This is 
because of the fact of how much weight America gives to the law and how much the Supreme 
Court stands by the law. Because of this, it is vital to understand that now this decision is the law 
of the land, people will now have to accept this as law and it will very well dictate society‘s 
ideological view. A clear cut example of this can be found in the difference between Plessey v. 
Ferguson to Brown v. Board of Education. This is an example of how society first felt 
―Separate‖ was ―Equal.‖ However, as Board of Education was handed down and schools began 
to integrate, society‘s ideological position began to change. Though there will be pockets of 
those who may hold onto prior ideological viewpoints, the law creates an atmosphere where 
majority of individuals viewpoints will change. Finally, this research can be a step towards 
producing further research concerning the Court. As stated before, this decision resembles a 
tipping point in how the Supreme Court decides cases that concern freedom of speech. As a 
result, future scholars will have to analyze the Court decisions and its effects. Possibly the future 
research can be produced to quantify the implications drawn within this study.  
This study explored the premise that the law is just as important to examine in rhetorical 
scholarship as much as speeches and other rhetorical text. Rhetoricians have to understand that 
the law is a binding influence on human behavior. As a result, it is very applicable to the field of 
Communication Studies and will help our field make better sense concerning human behavior. 
The Supreme Court is a great institution to analyze because the simple fact that their decisions 
are heavily packed with rhetoric and ideology.   
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